Richard Primuss
Judicial Power and Mobilizable History

The concern with juristocratic power is usually conceived as a matter of
the extent of judges’ power to declare the law, thus concretely directing the
government to conduct its business in particular ways. These concrete
manifestations of judicial power, however, are not the only form of judicial
influence over national affairs or constitutional meaning. In addition to
establishing the law, courts also shape the ways in which the legal community
thinks about constitutional issues. This paper is about the judicial influence over
historical modes of constitutional interpretation. Its basic argument is that the
vast expanse of possible historical arguments offers courts (and especially the
Supreme Court) an opportunity not just to decide what constitutional history will
mean but also to shape the availability heuristics that limit other actors’ ability to
mobilize alternative historical accounts in support of other constitutional
meanings. I do not wish to overstate the proposition: judicial accounts of history
and its meanings are not hegemonic, and counterhistories can and sometimes
have been successfully deployed against prevailing doctrine. Nonetheless, the
dynamic is worth noting. I suggest that awareness of this dynamic should prompt
law professors to see the nurturing of alternative “mobilizable histories” as one of
their responsibilities.
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In addition to deciding cases, judges also instruct wider audiences in how
to think about the issues and authorities of constitutional law. Judicial opinions
are in part instruments of that instruction, an instruction that is carried out both by
unmediated transmission from judges to readers of opinions and also, on a larger
scale, through the mediating retransmission of agents like casebooks and law
professors.1 These influences are more subtle and diffuse than the direct
consequences of judicial holdings, but they are sufficiently significant that several
leading constitutional theorists have emphasized this aspect of the judicial role in
their defenses of the practice of judicial review. For example, Frank Michaelman
and Christopher Eisgruber, among others, have argued that Supreme Court
decisionmaking in constitutional cases has the distinctly beneficial effect of
modeling principled decisionmaking for the wider public, providing an object
lesson in how to think seriously about important and contested issues in the
American polity.2
But the judiciary’s modeling of constitutional argumentation also has a
darker side. When a court engages in constitutional interpretation, it construes
sources of constitutional authority. If another interpreter understands the
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authorities differently, he or she or it may have the opportunity to push back,
offering a rival interpretation. The dynamics by which the contest between such
rival interpretations would resolve in practice are the subject of a large scholarly
literature, as is the normative question of whether there is an institutional reason
why the judicial interpretation ought to prevail by reason of its being judicial.
Sometimes, a court adjudicates a constitutional question in a way that leaves the
underlying constitutional discourse relatively unchanged. But sometimes, a
court’s construction of a kind of authority (or a consistent construction of that
authority by several courts over time) does more than stake out the judicial
position. It also alters the underlying resources that could be used to argue
against that position, thus tilting the balance yet more heavily toward the
judiciary’s own view.
Consider the judicial use of history as a source of constitutional reasoning.
Without a doubt, the narrative of American history is an important source of
authority in constitutional argument. Prevailing understandings of the Founding
era help shape the prevailing interpretations of many rules and principles of
constitutional law, and the prevailing understandings of the Civil War and the
Reconstruction period shape others. Other periods of history are also part of the
mix, and often historical authority is constructed (consciously or not) as a
synthesized story about multiple periods of history. Standing alone, an
interpreter’s view of American history may not be sufficient to resolve a difficult
issue: most of the time, most interpreters reach their conclusions through a mix
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of different kinds of authority rather than on the basis of a single type.3 But
different understandings of history will yield different ranges of conclusions that
constitutional interpreters are willing to accept.4
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This is a feature of constitutional discourse despite the fact that there is no
general agreement among constitutional interpreters about exactly how or why
history should matter in constitutional interpretation. Different practitioners of
constitutional interpretation hold rival theories about the relevance of history, see,
e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution
(forthcoming Cardozo Law Review 2005), and constitutional interpretation as a
practice muddles through without settling the contest among them. It is probably
inevitable that history will supply some kind of basis for constitutional reasoning:
without a sense that history provides some kind of constitutional authority, it
might not be possible to make sense of an inherited constitutional system at all.
It does not follow, of course, that any given normative theory of history’s force in
constitutional law is correct, and it may not even follow that some such particular
theory must be correct if only we could figure out which one. It may be the case
instead that what constitutional discourse requires is simply some kind of
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engagement with history on which we can make sense of the constitution’s
persistence as more than a brute fact of power, in which case multiple forms of
historical engagement could coexist and do the job perfectly well even in the
absence of any particular theory’s being acceptable to the community of
constitutional interpreters as a whole. These important questions are beyond the
scope of this paper.
5

History is not unique in this respect. Similar things could be said about
other major sources of constitutional interpretation, including the text of the
written Constitution. There is an important respect, however, in which text and
history are differently susceptible to the power of judicial construction. When the
Supreme Court decides a case in a way that seems to be in tension with the text
of the written Constitution, the text survives as an argumentative resource that
can be mobilized against the Court’s decision in the future. The Court does not
rewrite the document to conform better to judicial doctrine. Instead, there comes
to be a gap between judicial doctrine and constitutional text, and the gap is
visible to observers who read both the text and the judicial opinions.
This is not to say that the words of the document have permanently stable
meanings, nor is it to deny that the Court’s own interpretations often shift our
“common-sense” understandings of what a word in a legal document might
mean. Nonetheless, many a law student wrinkled his nose at the Court’s
expansive construction of “interstate commerce” even when Wickard v. Filburn5
had been the law for decades and United States v. Lopez6 was not yet decided,
just as many law students today see that the text of the Eleventh Amendment will
not support what the Supreme Court does with Eleventh Amendment doctrine.7
The potential and sometimes highly visible gap between judicial doctrine and

5

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

6

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

7
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constitutional text is what enabled Attorney General Edwin Meese to insist on his
distinction between “constitutional law” and “the Constitution,” and over a period
of years he and others used that gap to advance a set of arguments against
then-current doctrine, ultimately achieving notable if partial success in altering
constitutional law.8 As long as the text of the Constitution is unaltered and highly
visible, many readers will experience a tension between that text and a variety of
judicial decisions. For them, as it was for Meese, the text is then a mobilizable
resource that can be used to argue against prevailing judicial doctrine.
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See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Guidelines on
Constitutional Litigation (1988); id. at 54 (characterizing Wickard as inconsistent
with sound interpretation of the Commerce Clause). Lopez can be seen as an
eventual victory for Meese’s campaign.

7

The situation is not exactly the same when the Supreme Court declares
the meaning of some aspect of constitutional history. There are important
similarities, of course: judicial decisions in constitutional cases construe the
meaning of history as well as the meaning of text, and persuasive or long-lasting
constructions of either history or text can prompt the community of lawyers to
approach the relevant text or the relevant history in the way that the Supreme
Court has taught them to do so. But for interpreters seeking to contest a
juristocratic domination of constitutional meaning, history is often a less
mobilizable resource than text is.9 In part, history may be less mobilizable than
text because Supreme Court decisions interpreting the meaning of constitutional
history can do something closer to rewriting the underlying object of interpretation
than decisions interpreting the meaning of text can. To be sure, the Court does
not dispatch the marshals to burn history books with contrary interpretations of
the American past. But given the vast range of possible histories from which to
draw meaning, and given also the influence of court decisions in legal discourse,
9

I do not mean here that arguments based on history may be less effective or
less persuasive than arguments based on text. That may or may not be true. I
mean to say that whatever the possible range of persuasive arguments based on
one or the other of these modalities of argument (See Philip Bobbit,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982)) may be, it may be harder to marshal the full
potential (or any given proportion of that potential) of historical argument against
judicial doctrine than it is to marshal the full (or the same proportion of) potential
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the Supreme Court’s decisions can and often do obscure aspects of history other
than those emphasized in the Court’s own opinions.

of a textual argument.
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This dynamic is a matter of availability heuristics. Unlike the constitutional
text, which every lawyer knows where to find and can read in less than an hour,
the full corpus of American constitutional history is not knowable to lawyers or
indeed to anyone else. This is not just a matter of the indeterminacy of historical
meaning: text, too, has indeterminate meaning, even if not in all of the same
ways. It is also because there is just too much constitutional history for it all to be
held in anyone’s head, let alone to be held in anyone’s head from all plausible
perspectives. It certainly cannot be presented in a few pages, pages that—like
the Constitutional text—are highly portable and highly visible elements of
American constitutional culture. To be sure, even within those few pages of
constitutional text, there are parts that are more visible than others to the
community of constitutional interpreters, or to different interpreters within that
community.10 The text of (some parts of) the Fourteenth Amendment is more
familiar to most of us than the text of the Twentieth (or indeed other parts of the
Fourteenth), and we more readily make arguments based on what is familiar.
Nonetheless, a constitutional argument can draw nontrivial support from a less
familiar part of the text, once someone draws our attention to it, because there is
at least a default presumption—what we might call the “surplusage instinct”—that
10

See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment 99 Yale L.J.
637 (1989) (imagining how two different constitutional interpreters, one from the
left and one from the right, would draw cognitive maps of the Bill of Rights on the
model of Saul Steinberg’s famous conceptual depiction of the New Yorker’s view
of the world: the former draws a large Establishment Clause, a large Fourth
Amendment, a large Fifth Amendment except for the Takings Clause, a large
Eighth Amendment, and a large Ninth Amendment, keeping the other parts
small, while the latter draws a large Free Exercise Clause, a large Second
Amendment, a large Takings Clause, and a large Tenth Amendment, keeping the
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all parts of the text have meaning.11 Given the lesser availability of
deemphasized history, as well as the need to argue about whether history not
made authoritative by prior Court decisions has any kind of authority in the first
place, the universe of historical narratives that support argument in constitutional
law can be powerfully narrowed by what the Court makes visible or less visible.12

other parts small.
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This is so both because the Court’s simple power within the judiciary will
prompt litigants to argue in terms compatible with the Court’s interpretations and
because its broader influence in legal discourse will familiarize the legal
community with some narratives rather than others.
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The limitation of historical narratives is not only a matter of what
incidentally becomes more and less visible as a result of which narratives a court
tells. It is also a matter of the Court’s power when it overtly adopts some
meanings of history rather than others. Consider, as one recent example, a
passage from United States v. Morrison about the authority of history, a passage
pregnant enough to have attracted the attention of a handful of leading
constitutional scholars.13 In the relevant passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explains the limited scope of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment by characterizing Reconstruction as a limited reform rather than a
fundamental reworking of the American polity. To support this historical
interpretation, the Chief Justice notes that the Supreme Court of the 1880s
adopted that view in cases like United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases. He also specifies the modality of constitutional argument that he means
to be making, saying that the weight of that earlier Court’s view is partly a matter
of their authoritative historical understanding. The judges of the 1880s lived
through the events, he says, and knew what those events really meant.14 If one
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See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622 (“The force of the doctrine of stare decisis
behind these decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on
the books, but also from theinsight attributable to the Members of the Court at
that time. Every Member had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant,
Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur—and each of their judicial appointees obviously had
intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”) Rehnquist’s argument about the 1880s Court’s
special authority to construe the meaning of Reconstruction history is not original
to Morrison: Justice Jackson made the same argument, in basically the same
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looks at the history of Reconstruction and of the 1880s through a wider frame, of
course, it becomes clear that the meanings of the relevant constitutional events
were deeply contested. But if a later Court can say that historical events mean
what a particular subset (here, a judicial subset) of its contemporary observers
said that those events meant, the Court has a significant chance of obscuring
other readings of history that could be mobilized to support a contrary set of
meanings. In that way, judicial attempts to settle historical interpretation by virtue
of their decisional authority can be profitably compared to attempts to rewrite the
constitutional text to eliminate tension between text and doctrine.
I do not mean to say that the two enterprises are fully analogous. As
noted earlier, the Court does not dispatch the marshals to change the history
books. Moreover, the Supreme Court is only one of many forces shaping
people’s background understandings of American history. Even if the Court said
“only this history shall count,” the legal community’s familiarity with history would
never be confined to that or any other static set of information and
understandings, and the tension between other things that lawyers know and the
rulings of the courts could be a mobilizable resource when people contest
established doctrine.

words, almost fifty years earlier. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657-58
(1951).
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That said, the history that forms the basis for constitutional argument is
heavily shaped by caselaw, meaning both that Supreme Court decisions are
taken to represent the narrative of history and that the history that judges purvey
in their opinions powerfully shapes (and limits) the history that legal discourse will
deploy.15 As a practical matter, judicial decisions construing the import of
constitutional history do not merely establish one or another reading of that
history as authoritative. They also exercise an important influence on the
visibility of different elements of constitutional history, thus shaping which
elements of the past become historical narratives that will support arguments
about constitutional law. Only those aspects of history that will support such
arguments are worth contesting in constitutional discourse. Accordingly, past
events and historical accounts that are not made visible within constitutional
discourse are likely to be excluded from the set of tools that can be mobilized by
people who wish to check or critique exercises of judicial power. The object of
historically oriented constitutional interpretation thus itself changes based upon
what the judges say. This is true to some extent of all modalities of constitutional
15

As a matter of legal craft, there are arguments weighing in favor of letting prior
cases establish a relatively settled set of historical meanings rather than
permitting a constant contest about the valence of competing historical
narratives. Among other things, the former alternative increases stability and
consistency in legal interpretation. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 509 (1996). Moreover, some constitutional scholars have
argued that judges are actually pretty good synthesizers and interpreters of
history, so it makes sense to let them do it. See Barry Friedman and Scott B.
Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1, 88 (1998). But
there are also negative consequences. Judicially synthesized history will
systematically flatten the past by rejecting or at least obscuring many historical
understandings other than the few that are chosen as official meanings, and
stability achieved by making a few strains of history authoritative will limit not just
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argument, but the extent must be greater when the potentially available
arguments from that modality are more diffuse, less codified, and less visible.
When judges tell certain stories and not others, they affect not only how we will
understand those particular stories but also the universe of stories of which we
are aware, and can contest, in the first place.16
In this respect, historical argument in constitutional law is less analogous
to textual argument than it is to arguments from principles like federalism, the
separation of powers, or the proper functioning of democratic politics.
Constitutional history, like federalism or political democracy, is a substantive
feature of the constitutional system. In a way comparable to the way in which
constitutional decisionmaking is partly about choosing which of several
federalisms we should have, it is also partly about choosing what our history
should be—which includes not just what the history means but also which
elements of history should be the subject of interpretive consideration. Perhaps
to make sense of ourselves as the inheritors of a particular constitutional system,
or to explain why we recognize the practices and decisions of prior generations
as having some sort of authoritative status in our decisionmaking, or perhaps

uncertainty in the law but also the possibility of critique.
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To borrow Robert Cover’s language in describing the relationship of law and
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simply to shape a national narrative or a national identity in which we take pride
and satisfaction, one of the desiderata of constitutional argument is that it should
establish American history as having developed this way instead of that way, or
as illustrating this set of ideals instead of that one. This desideratum does not
merely push different constitutional interpreters to to interpret a fixed stock of
historical data in different ways. It also affects which elements of the
constitutional past different interpreters will want to foreground as meaningful
constitutional history, thus shaping the choice of what our history will be.
We all form our notions of the core commitments of constitutional law—
what Mark Tushnet calls the “thin Constitution”17--partly under the influence of a
superstory about American history, just as our notions of that superstory are
formed partly through the influence of what we think the core commitments of
constitutional law should be. To sit comfortably within the rubric of constitutional
law, a rule or an idea must cohere tolerably with the content of constitutional
history. What constitutional history is or means is a central element of what is
contested in constitutional law. When the Supreme Court articulates a view of
constitutional history that foregrounds some elements of that history and not
others—as any view of history must—there is a risk that the elements of history it
neglects will disappear from the view of the legal community. In other words, the
juristocratic control of historical meaning is supported by the juristocratic
influence over what history is visible. The possibility of healthy continuing contest
over what history we should have, and what range of constitutional law it will
17
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support, requires that non-judicial interpreters of the constitution—including law
professors—ensure that other parts of history are also visible and discussed.
That visibility is a prerequisite for history’s being mobilizable against as well as
for prevailing judicial doctrine.
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